APEC Transportation Safety Working Group, South China Sea Issues

August 8, 2010

IN THIS UPDATE:
  • APEC
  • ASEAN DMM+
  • South China Sea
  • Indonesia
  • Vietnam

Looking Ahead...

Opportunity to participate in APEC Transportation Safety Working Group September 21-23. Reach out to Ana Guevara at guevara@aventiassociates.com

APEC Transportation Safety Working Group Opportunity

Follow this link for information from the APEC Transportation Safety Working Group. They are organizing a workshop in Bali this September 21-23 focused on “Creating Partnerships and Using Technology to improve airport Safety.” The goal is to help promote regionalization to areas where air transport is limited due to safety limitations.  

The organizers are expecting about 40 APEC airport and civil aviation officials to attend, and have a goal of at least doubling that with private sector participants.  They will actively be match-making participating companies that have state-of-the-art technologies with these officials.

Follow this link for information on opportunities to serve as a panelist, exhibit products and plans, sponsor the event, or simply attend.

 

ASEAN DMM+

Vietnam to host 1 st ASEAN Defense Minister Plus meeting, People’s Daily, July 29

Vietnam will host the first ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) in the capital city Hanoi on Oct. 12 this year, said Vietnamese Deputy Minister of Defense Nguyen Chi Vinh here at a press conference on Thursday.

The meeting is expected to draw defense ministers from member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and eight ASEAN dialogue partners including Australia, China, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Russia and the United States, and representatives from the ASEAN Secretariat, said Vinh.

Vinh said that the meeting marks a new development in the cooperation between ASEAN and its dialogue partners to deal with increasingly complicated and transnational security issues. It is aimed at building trust and confidence among participating countries.

The conference takes place in the context that peace and development has become a tendency and cross-border non-traditional challenges are emerging which a single country cannot solve, he said.

During the upcoming meeting, the defense ministers are expected to discuss a variety of issues including humanitarian aid, disaster relief, maritime security, counter-terrorism, and peace- keeping operations.

South China Sea

Concerned about China’s rise, Southeast Asian nations build up militaries, Washington Post, August 9

The nations of Southeast Asia are building up their militaries, buying submarines and jet fighters at a record pace and edging closer strategically to the United States as a hedge against   China's   rise and its claims to all of the South China Sea.

Weapons acquisitions in the region almost doubled from 2005 to 2009 compared with the five preceding years, according to data released by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute this year.

"There is a threat perception among some of the countries in Southeast Asia," said Siemon Wezeman, senior fellow at the institute. "China is an issue there."

The buying spree is set to continue, with reports that Vietnam has agreed to pay $2.4 billion for six Russian Kilo-class submarines and a dozen Su-30MKK jet fighters equipped for maritime warfare. This is in addition to Australia's stated commitment to buy or build nine more submarines and bolster its air force with 100 U.S.-built F-35s. Malaysia has also paid more than $1 billion for two diesel submarines from   France , and Indonesia has recently announced that it, too, will acquire new submarines.

Concerns in Southeast Asia about China's rise were on display in Hanoi in mid-July during a regional security forum that included the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the United States, China and other Asian powers. During the meeting, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton for the first time   effectively rejected China's claims to sovereignty over the whole 1.3 million-square-mile sea. Eleven other nations, led by Vietnam, backed the United States, leaving Chinese foreign minister Yang Jiechi noticeably shaken by the offensive, diplomats present said.

The Great Game for the Spratlys: Vietnam Takes Control, Asia Sentinel, August 6

Vietnam has been remarkably successful in getting the South China Sea issue back onto the international agenda, in the process underscoring its new ties with the United States and asserting Hanoi's leadership of Asean on this issue. 

China is furious but its reaction, seemingly driven by President Hu and the People's Liberation Army rather than the foreign ministry in strongly re-asserting China's claims to the whole sea, has brought further attention to the issue. It is being watched closely by Japan, and Russia and India are continuing to strengthen their relations with Vietnam partly with the sea issue and navigation rights in mind.

However, the Southeast Asian countries in dispute with China would be in a very much stronger position to confront China's claims if they were able to resolve their own conflicting claims or at least engage in the joint exploitation to which they are in theory pledged. There is scant sign to date that they are going in that direction. 

Essentially there are two rather separate issues in the dispute. The first, which involves only the littoral countries China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei (for these purposes Taiwan's claims are the same as China's).

The second is about freedom of navigation. That involves all major nations for whom the waterway is crucial for their shipping, including nearby countries like Indonesia as well as Japan, the US, etc. As China claims dominion over the entire sea as well as its various islands and rocks, acceptance of its claim would turn the sea into a Chinese lake to which others could only have access with China's consent even though China and Taiwan between them own only about 20 the sea's coastline.

Indonesia additionally has a separate issue. Although China's claims do not impinge on any of its land waters, they come so close to the Natuna gas field that issues of ownership of gas deposits could become disputed, as well as seabed rights to the northeast of the Natuna field.

Offshore oil and gas is important for the Southeast Asian states but much less so for China, for whom the region's reserves are assumed to be relatively small compared to its needs. Likewise fishing is of some interest to all the nations but over-fishing means this is less and less significant. China's over-riding interest is strategic.

Of the various disputed groups, the Paracels, which lie due east of Danang, are only claimed by Vietnam and China – which forcibly occupied them in the dying days of the South Vietnam regime. Only China and the Philippines dispute the Scarborough shoal and Macclesfield bank.

It is the Spratly group which is the main bone of contention, with all claimants overlapping and where the non-Chinese ones need to find some common ground. Vietnam claims all the Spratlys by right of historical occupation even though most of them lie closer to the Philippine and Malaysian coasts.(China's claims are similarly based on history, real or imagined) The Philippines claims most but not all on a mixture of principles – the archipelago principle, continental shelf, and occupation of empty territory. The Malaysian and Brunei claims are based on the continental shelf principle – the islands lie in seabed of less than 200 meters in depth extending from their coastline.

As of now Vietnam has a presence on about 20, China about nine, the Philippines about eight, Malaysia three and Taiwan just on1 of the islands, rocks and shoals. With such conflicting bases for their claims, as well as the claims themselves, it will be extraordinarily difficult for the non-Chinese nations to get together. Nationalist sentiment runs against abandoning any claims. Seemingly meaningless rocks become national symbols. Nor does it seem likely that they would agree to submit to international arbitration rulings in the way that Malaysia settled disputes with Indonesia and Singapore. 

But they could surely agree – and in this be joined by Indonesia and maybe Singapore – in asserting both freedom of navigation and the principle that claims to specific islands do not include claims to 200-mile economic zones. 

The navigation issue is doubly important because the main shipping channels, through which pass a major portion of global sea trade -- run to the north of the Spratlys, an area of widely varying depths and many shoals. The islands themselves are of economic value and only the continental shelves appear to offer oil and gas prospects.

On the question of history the non-Chinese could also form a common front – at least if they were better informed about their pre-colonial pasts. Vietnam's claims are based on Vietnamese imperial records. But a much earlier claim can be made for the Cham empire, based in what is now central Vietnam. The Cham were a Hinduized, Austronesian (same language family as Malay, Tagalog etc) -speaking people who ran much of the trade in the south China sea until the 15th century. Vietnam may be reluctant to make a claim based on a nation it wiped out, but there is abundant evidence of trading across the southern and central part of this sea long before the Chinese became involved.

Indeed despite the name given to it by westerners and then translated into Malay and Tagalog, the South China Sea is more a Malay than a Chinese sea. In the days of the Cham empire it was known as the Cham Sea. Seafarers from Borneo ran the spice trade with China while those from Sumatra (the Sri Vijayan empire and others) the shipping that brought Chinese Buddhist pilgrims to India and Sri Lanka, and reached the coasts of Africa a thousand years before China's Admiral Zheng He during the Ming dynasty.

Indeed, if the Asean claimants were to start with a joint study of their history trading and fishing across the sea, they might have a better grasp of where their interests now lie.

What lies beneath the South China Sea, The Irrawaddy, June 24

The governments of Southeast Asia, already fertile ground for defense companies, have embarked on a round of buying submarines, the utility, safety and strategic value of which looks doubtful. In fact, they may actually increase tensions in the region as their lurking menace could swiftly turn a naval encounter from an incident into a crisis.

Singapore started it in 1995 by buying a surplus Swedish navy boat, with a further three ordered in 1997, perhaps with designs to manufacture them on license rather than for defense. The first was commissioned in mid-2000 and further orders have since been made as the original boats have been retired.

Malaysia ordered two new Scorpene-class submarines from the Franco-Spanish DCNS/ Navantia consortium in 2002, with the first just having arrived in the country this year.

In late 2009 Vietnam ordered six Kilo-class submarines from a Russian yard, with the first delivery due by 2012. The governments of Indonesia and Thailand are also both considering acquiring new submarines.

However, the growing use of unmanned underwater vehicles, in line with the better-known unmanned aerial 'drones,' is eroding the submarines' raison d'être—particularly as defense budgets are squeezed and technology offers less costly but comparable results.

The economic and technical metrics of operating manned submarines make them among the most expensive weapon in any national arsenal. There are no accurate figures tabulating the capital and recurring costs of submarine programs in Singapore, Malaysia and now Vietnam, including bases and crew training. But in order to keep one submarine operational a minimum of two boats, but preferably three, are needed. Each boat requires two full crews—plus support personnel and facilities.

Rough figures for the three navies make acquisition costs alone well in excess of US$3 billion, with combined annual running costs unlikely to fall much below US$1 billion by 2015, to marginally enhance deterrence of an enemy that is unlikely to materialize.

The cost-benefit value of conventional submarines—against the perceived value of boats that carry the nuclear deterrence of major powers—is also questionable. Since the end of World War II, Russia, France, the US, Britain, China and Israel together have lost at least 17 submarines in peacetime accidents. Only two have been recorded as being lost in conflicts. Over the same period just three vessels are acknowledged to have been sunk by submarines—the Indian frigate Khukri during the 1971 war with Pakistan, the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano by a British boat during the 1982 Falklands conflict and the South Korean corvette Cheonan in an attack by a North Korean mini-submarine in 2010.

Even as the Southeast Asians embark on their buying spree, many countries are reducing the size of their submarine fleets—notably Germany—or have scrapped them altogether, like Denmark. Other European powers are set to cancel or delay new building programs based on economic and strategic assessments.

The attraction of submarines to defense planners lies in their stealth, flexibility and deterrence. A conventional diesel-electric submarine armed with torpedoes, mines and anti-ship missiles and equipped with modern air-independent propulsion systems is a formidable weapon that the most advanced navies have to respect.

Their principal weakness is their high acquisition and running cost, the demands placed on an often limited skill base and their vulnerability within confined or shallow waters. These factors have led most Southeast Asian navies to concentrate their resources on developing surface forces rather than invest in submarines that offered doubtful strategic or even tactical benefits.

Indonesia

RI wants to buy US Fighters, Cargo Jets, Jakarta Post, July 1

Indonesia told the US it wants to buy billions of dollars of American-made military aircraft, in hopes that a US-embargo on military sales to the country may soon be lifted, a Defense Ministry spokesman says.

“During a bilateral meeting, the Indonesian government expressed its interest to purchase F-16 and C-130H Hercules [cargo] aircraft to complete its squadrons,” Defense Ministry spokesman I Wayan Midhio said on Wednesday.

Indonesian Defense Minister Purnomo Yusgiantoro and US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates discussed the potential sale during the Shangri-La defense dialogue in Singapore last month, Wayan said.

The US welcomed Indonesia’s proposal to buy more US-made military equipment, he added.

The US also pledged US$15.7 million to Indonesia in 2010 and $20 million in 2011 under the aegis of capacity-building programs to help “modernize” the Indonesian Military (TNI), Wayan said.

Military aid will be in the form of training and education to be carried out in both Indonesia and the US, he added. The US offered to sell surplus fighter jets at steeply-discounted prices to persuade Indonesia to buy, Wayan said.

Indonesia currently has only four operational jet fighters — less than a single squadron — University of Indonesia’s military expert Andi Widjajanto said. Each squadron should have eight to 12 planes depending on operational, maintenance and training plans.  

The Air Force has two operational commands in the country’s east and west. Each command has two bases, which in turn require eight fighter squadrons per base, he said.

A fifth-generation F-16 jet fighter costs between $120 million and $140 million, without munitions. A fourth-generation F-16 Falcon fighter costs between $88 million and $90 million, without munitions, Andi said.

There is a surplus of F-16s on the global arms market due to production overruns by US defense contractor manufacturer Lockheed Martin. The company’s capacity still reflects Cold War production levels, Andi added.

The US is also replacing its squadrons of F-16 with newer F-22 Raptors and F-35 Lightnings, he said. Both oversupply and change in preference have lowered prices for F-16s in the global market, he said.

It is unlikely that the country can purchase F-16s from the US because an embargo on arms sales to Indonesia is still in effect, Andi said.

“Almost 90 percent of the embargo has been lifted since 2006, but lethal weapons sales have not been lifted and I think there is no sign that the US will do so,” he said.

“Therefore, purchasing a Hercules [cargo aircraft] may not be a problem, but purchasing a F-16 plane can be.”

The US Congress imposed the military embargo over a decade ago citing human rights violations committed by the Indonesian Army’s Special Forces (Kopassus) in West Papua and Timor Leste (then East Timor).

However a recently-signed bilateral defense framework arrangement allows Indonesia to procure military equipment from the US, as previously reported, though the US stated it still expects Kopassus to respect human rights.

Government agrees to sizeable expansion in defense budget, Jakarta Globe, May 4

The government has announced a plan to boost the defense budget from 0.9 percent of GDP to between 1.2 and 1.5 percent, citing the need for the military to meet the “minimum essential force” to thwart external threats.  

“The increase will take effect next year,” Defense Minister Purnomo Yusgiantoro said on Tuesday after a cabinet meeting with the president at the State Palace.  

He declined to give an exact figure for the budget.  

The ministry’s 2010 budget is Rp 40.7 trillion ($4.5 billion), most of it allocated to payroll. With GDP this year projected at Rp 5,000 trillion, the ministry’s 2011 budget could top Rp 60 trillion.  

“We informed the president that we need the extra funding for our main weapons system, so our military can reach its minimum essential force,” Purnomo said. “We also need to consider budgeting for dealing with foreign exploitation of natural resources and energy in our border areas.”  

He said the ministry would scale down its payroll allocation and shift more funding toward weapons procurement, saying the restructured budget would be one of “zero human resources growth.”  

President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono earlier said he had discussed drafting a national defense policy.  

“Such a strategic policy will need presidential approval and be valid for five years,” he said. “It will serve as a reference for policies to build up the armed forces and modernize our defenses.”  

Yudhoyono claimed that defense budgets prior to 2009 had been relatively small, although the CIA estimates Indonesia’s defense budget in 2005 as around 3 percent of GDP.  

“They were small compared to the defense budgets of Asean and other countries and as a proportion of GDP,” the president said. “However, with a growing GDP and increased state budget, now is the time to significantly increase our defense budget.”  

He said that the correct long-term national defense strategy was required to use the budget effectively.  

“We hope that by 2014, our defense policy and armed forces will be close to meeting our minimum essential force,” he said.

Vietnam

Former Enemies US, Vietnam now military mates, AP, August 8

Cold War enemies the United States and Vietnam demonstrated their blossoming military relations Sunday as a U.S. nuclear supercarrier cruised in waters off the Southeast Asian nation's coast — sending a message that China is not the region's only big player.

The visit comes 35 years after the Vietnam War as Washington and Hanoi are cozying up in a number of areas, from negotiating a controversial deal to share civilian nuclear fuel and technology to agreeing that China needs to work with its neighbors to resolve territorial claims in the South China Sea.

The USS George Washington's stop is officially billed as a commemoration of last month's 15th anniversary of normalized diplomatic relations between the former foes. But the timing also reflects Washington's heightened interest in maintaining security and stability in the Asia-Pacific amid tensions following the sinking of a South Korean warship in March, which killed 46 sailors. North Korea has been blamed for the attack, but has vehemently denied any involvement.

Last month during an Asian security meeting in Vietnam's capital, Hanoi, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton also angered China by unexpectedly calling on the Communist powerhouse to resolve territorial claims with neighboring Southeast Asian countries over islands in the South China Sea.

"The strategic implications and importance of the waters of the South China Sea and the freedom of navigation is vital to both Vietnam and the United States," Capt. Ross Myers, commander of the George Washington's air wing, said aboard the ship Sunday as fighter jets thundered off the flight deck above.

"I'm certain that the Chinese government and the Chinese people are trying to protect their interests," he added when asked about China's increased aggressiveness within the area. "It is more important for Vietnam (and) its partners to establish that they have an equal right to economic prosperity and peace within the region as well."

Chinese navy ships were seen shadowing the USS George Washington at a distance over the past several days as the supercarrier made its way throught the South China Sea along Vietnam's eastern coast, U.S. Navy officials said Sunday.

 Canadian firm says in deal for Vietnam Navy aircraft, AFP, May 12

A Canadian company says it has become the first Western firm to build fixed-wing aircraft for the military in communist Vietnam, which is seeking to upgrade its maritime defences.

Viking Air of Victoria, British Columbia, said it has finalised with the Vietnamese navy a purchase agreement for six amphibious DHC-6 Twin Otter Series 400 aircraft, in a statement obtained by AFP on Wednesday.

It said the deal would give the navy its first fleet of fixed-wing aircraft, some of which are designed specifically for marine patrol.

Each aircraft is priced at more than five million Canadian dollars (around five million US) but a Viking spokeswoman told AFP the total value of the deal, which includes flight training and other components, was yet to be determined.

The planes are scheduled for delivery from 2012 to 2014.

Vietnam late last month approved an 8.5-billion-dollar economic and defence development plan for a string of islands along its resource-rich coastline, as a broader maritime sovereignty dispute simmers with China.

In December Vietnam and Russia -- a longtime supplier of military equipment to Hanoi -- signed a major arms deal reported to involve the purchase of six submarines.

Analysts said the deal aims to bolster claims against China over potentially resource-rich islands in the South China Sea.

Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung confirmed only that the Russian deal included submarines along with aircraft and "military equipment".

Russian media have reported that the aircraft order involved 12 Sukhoi Su-30MK2 warplanes. They are among the world's most advanced and could provide air cover for the surface fleet, analysts said.

Vietnam to spend billions islands amid china dispute, AFP, May 4

Vietnam has announced an 8.5-billion-dollar economic and defence development plan for a string of islands along its resource-rich coastline, as a broader sovereignty dispute simmers with China.

A copy of the plan, dated April 28, was obtained by AFP on Tuesday.

It calls for development over a 10-year period of a string of islands stretching from Phu Quoc near Cambodia in the southwest to Cat Ba off Haiphong in the north near China.

The document says authorities aim to boost seafood, tourism, agro-forestry and other sectors under the plan, which will require an estimated investment of 162.5 trillion dong (8.5 billion dollars) over 10 years to 2020.

"That's a significant wad of cash for Vietnam to be spending," said Ian Storey, a fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore. The plan also calls for increased investment in the islands' defences.

"It is essential to pay attention to security and defence tasks during arrangements for economic and civil projects on islands," the document says, calling for them to become an "outer defence stronghold".

The stronghold would include the Spratlys, the document says, although the South China Sea archipelago is not among the islands listed for the economic development initiative. Vietnam and China are engaged in a long-running dispute over sovereignty of the Spratlys and another archipelago to the north, the Paracels, which China occupies. The archipelagos are considered strategic outposts with potentially vast oil and gas reserves and rich fishing grounds.

Taiwan also claims the Paracels, while the Spratlys are claimed in full or in part by China and Vietnam as well as the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan. Over the past year Vietnam has reported cases of fishing boats and equipment being seized by China.

In the latest incident, reported by the state Vietnam News on Monday, China released 23 Vietnamese fishermen but allegedly kept one of their boats and gear worth 500 million dong. The men were arrested while fishing off the Paracels.

Among the islands included in Vietnam's development plan are Phu Quy and Con Dao, off southern Vietnam, where the country already produces oil and gas.

Last year a US State Department official said Beijing told US and other foreign oil companies to halt work with Vietnamese partners in the South China Sea or face consequences.

While Vietnam's island initiative appears to be about economic development, "another factor would be the need to protect these offshore oil and gas deposits" as well as fishing stocks, Storey said.

In December, Vietnam reached a major arms deal with Russia that was reported to involve the purchase of six submarines. Analysts said the deal aimed to bolster Vietnam's maritime claims against China. The islands contribute about 0.2 percent of Vietnam's economy but this would more than double to 0.5 percent under the development plan, the government document said.

END MEMO

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