Myanmar Holds General Elections in Three Phases

Overview: What Happened 

Myanmar has conducted its first national elections since the February 2021 military coup through a phased, geographically selective, and tightly controlled process designed not to restore civilian rule, but to repackage military dominance within a civilianized institutional framework. 

The election is unfolding in three stages. The first phase, held on 28 December 2025, covered 102 of Myanmar’s 330 townships (approximately 31 percent national coverage). The second phase, conducted on 11 January 2026, expanded voting to additional townships firmly under military control. The final phase is scheduled for 25 January 2026. 

Voting has been suspended in at least 65 townships due to security concerns, disproportionately affecting conflict-affected and ethnic minority areas. These exclusions, combined with widespread displacement, have structurally limited participation and ensured that large segments of the electorate remain disenfranchised. 

The election is administered by the military-appointed Union Election Commission (UEC) and follows the dissolution, disqualification, or boycott of major political parties. Most notably, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) was dissolved and barred from participation. Several prominent ethnic and opposition parties—including the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD), Karen National Democratic Party (KNDP), Chin National League for Democracy (CNLD), and others—either boycotted the process or were disqualified through legal and administrative mechanisms. As a result, political competition has been confined largely to military-aligned or military-approved parties, sharply constraining inclusivity and representation.  

Early results from the first phase indicate overwhelming dominance by the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), the military’s proxy political party. These outcomes reflect an electoral environment characterized by the exclusion of meaningful challengers, a restricted media space, and a securitized campaign climate. While authorities report voter turnout of just over 52 percent in participating areas, this figure is well below pre-coup levels and cannot be interpreted as a genuine expression of nationwide political sentiment given extensive disenfranchisement, displacement, and organized boycotts. 

Taken together, the election functions less as a mechanism for popular mandate than as a procedural recalibration of military rule—a transition from emergency governance toward a civilian façade that preserves military central authority through constitutional guarantees, parliamentary dominance, and continued absolute control of the security apparatus. 

Key Election Figures 

Voter Turnout 

• Official turnout in Phase 1: 52.13 percent 
• Approximately 11.69 million registered voters were eligible in Phase 1 
• Approximately 6.09 million ballots cast 
• Nationwide eligible electorate estimated at over 24.26 million 
• Pre-coup turnout levels: approximately 70 percent in 2020 

Participation & Parties 

• 57 political parties formally contesting 
• 4,863 candidates competing for seats in national and regional legislatures 

Outcomes to Date 

The military-aligned Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) has dominated early returns from Phase 1: 

• Won 38 of 40 reported Pyithu Hluttaw (Lower House) seats 
• According to party sources, captured 88 of 102 contested seats in Phase 1, including regional assemblies 
• Secured 14 of 15 counted State and Regional Assembly seats 

Other Parties / Seats 

• Shan Nationalities Democratic Party: 1 seat 
• Mon Unity Party: 1 seat 
• Akha National Development Party: 1 regional assembly seat 
• Wa National Party: 1 Amyotha Hluttaw (Upper House) seat 

These results remain partial. Final national tallies will only be known after all three phases conclude. 

International Response 

The international reaction to Myanmar’s 2025–26 elections has been divided, revealing geopolitical fault lines and contrasting diplomatic strategies.  

ASEAN and Regional Engagement 

• Officially, ASEAN as a bloc did not send a formal observer mission to Myanmar’s elections due to a lack of consensus among member states and concerns that any accredited mission could be interpreted as legitimizing the process. Notwithstanding the bloc’s collective abstention, individual ASEAN countries did dispatch observers on a bilateral basis. 
• Myanmar State media and diplomatic sources report the arrival of international delegations from: 

                  - Cambodia (confirmed observer team)  

                  - Vietnam (observers delegation)

                  - Russia (observer delegation)  

                  - China (official observer delegation)  

                  - Kazakhstan (observer delegation)  

                  - India (delegation reported by Myanmar state media as observers, though New Delhi has publicly clarified there is no official observer status conferred by India)  

• The Philippines did not dispatch a separate election observation team; rather, its Ambassador in Myanmar was present at some polling stations during the election period.  

Western Responses 

• Western democracies and regional organizations have overwhelmingly rejected the elections as neither credible nor inclusive. The European Union explicitly ruled out sending observers and described the vote as “neither free nor fair.”  
• International civil society and rights networks, including more than 300 organizations, issued joint statements calling for international rejection of the elections and condemning them as a sham designed to entrench military rule.  
• The United States has been silent on the elections themselves. Notably, Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s statement on Myanmar’s Independence Day did not mention the election, democracy, or human rights—a marked shift from prior U.S. rhetorical posture. Washington’s handling of Myanmar appears to be awaiting the conclusion of its internal policy review, expected before Q2 2026. 

Key Figures to Watch 

1. Senior General Min Aung Hlaing 

Sr. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing remains the pivotal figure in Myanmar’s political trajectory. The election should be understood as a structural maneuver to entrench his control rather than a genuine democratic transition. 

Under Myanmar’s constitutional system, the presidency is chosen indirectly by the three parliamentary blocs: 

• Lower House (Pyithu Hluttaw), 
• Upper House (Amyotha Hluttaw), 
• and the 25% military bloc (appointed by the Commander-in-Chief). 

Each bloc nominates a presidential candidate; the candidate with the highest votes becomes President, the second becomes Vice President 1, and the third becomes Vice President 2. Because the military bloc retains its constitutionally guaranteed share and the USDP is dominant, Sr. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing is widely seen as the frontrunner to be nominated by the military and, potentially, to secure the presidency once full results and parliamentary seating are finalized. 

There are three plausible scenarios for his institutional positioning post-election: 

 a. Presidency plus Commander-in-Chief Role 
Sr. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing assumes the presidency and simultaneously retains his role as Commander-in-Chief. This would concentrate executive, military, and legislative influence in a single individual (or tightly interconnected offices), maximizing his control over the state. 

b. Presidency with Delegated Military Command 
He becomes President but relinquishes the formal Commander-in-Chief role to a trusted protégé (such as Kyaw Swar Lin or another loyalist). This preserves influence while allowing a degree of institutional layering that could be portrayed as “civilianization.” 

c. Supreme Military Commission Structure 
He forgoes both formal posts and, instead, chairs a Supreme Military Council or Commission that officially stands above both the presidency and the armed forces—a model reminiscent of the late General Prem’s role in Thailand as a behind-the-scenes arbiter. This structure could effectively render the President and Commander-in-Chief subordinate to a military-led council chaired by Min Aung Hlaing, formalizing a power hierarchy outside constitutional offices altogether. 

These scenarios are less about genuine power distribution and more about institutionalizing Min Aung Hlaing’s dominance and shielding him from accountability for post-coup violence and governance failures. 

2. U Khin Yi 

U Khin Yi, former Brigadier General and former Chief of Police under the State Peace and Development Council, now serves as Chairman of the USDP and is poised for a major parliamentary leadership role, likely as Speaker of the Lower House (Pyithu Hluttaw). However, there are clear indications within military and elite networks within Myanmar that he is not being primed to assume the presidency even with a landslide USDP win. 

It is worth noting that many current USDP parliamentary candidates were placed on the ticket after serving in senior military-appointed roles since the coup, bypassing longer-standing party figures. This reflects the USDP’s evolution into a military instrumentality rather than an autonomous political party shaped by internal seniority.  

3. U Nyo Saw 

Former General Nyo Saw, currently serving as Prime Minister and Chairman of the Foreign Exchange Supervisory Commission (FESC), is one of Myanmar’s key economic power brokers. His influence is centered on post-election economic management, sanctions navigation, elite coalition maintenance, and state-enterprise relations. Trust from the military leadership positions him as a de facto economic czar for the regime’s transition period. 

4. General Aung Lin Dwe 

Recently retired General U Aung Lin Dwe serves as a member of the ruling State Security and Peace Commission (SSPC) and as chief executive of the National Defense and Security Council (NDSC). Contesting a seat in the Upper House, he is widely expected to leverage any returned parliamentary authority into a powerful legislative leadership post—potentially Speaker of the Amyotha Hluttaw—which would enhance his institutional influence.  

5. General Kyaw Swar Lin 

General Kyaw Swar Lin, the youngest officer in Tatmadaw history to reach his rank, is a leading succession candidate for the role of Commander-in-Chief. His rapid promotion—despite no combat record—signals the regime’s prioritization of bureaucratic, technocratic control over battlefield credentials and perhaps more importantly, his absolute and unquestioning loyalty to Sr. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing. He currently serves as Chief of the General Staff of the Army, Navy, and Air Force (third highest ranking officer in the military), placing him at the apex of joint operational planning and inter-service coordination. Kyaw Swar Lin is widely regarded as a leading figure of the military’s “fourth generation” of leadership, representing a shift from combat-hardened commanders toward technocratic, and system-managed control, a profile well-suited to sustaining military dominance under a more institutionalized, post-coup political order.  
 

Bottom Line: The Council’s Take 

Myanmar’s planned election is not a democratic transition, but a managed reconfiguration of military rule. It is an election organized by the military, for the military—designed to redistribute authority within itself, not between the state and society. The objective is to move from personalized emergency rule toward a more routinized, civilian-facing governing structure that preserves military dominance while reducing international isolation and domestic operational friction. 

For Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, this process serves two purposes: entrenching power while lowering personal and institutional exposure stemming from the post-coup crisis. Institutional reshuffling, limited policy openings, and selective international engagement are aimed at normalizing Myanmar’s status as a functioning—if authoritarian—state. 

International reactions underscore geopolitical reality. Regional and authoritarian actors have signaled tolerance or participation, while Western governments have rejected the process outright. The United States’ relative silence on the election itself points to a policy recalibration still underway rather than endorsement, as Washington reassesses how to engage a durable but constrained military government in Myanmar.  

Inside Myanmar, there is no illusion that these elections are free or fair. What has shifted is public exhaustion. After years of conflict and economic collapse, many citizens are less focused on legitimacy than on whether this process might reduce the intensity of securitization, restore basic administrative functions, and allow economic life to operate with fewer disruptions.  

For business and economic actors, the significance of this election lies not in political reform, but in whether it produces greater predictability, institutionalized governance, and marginally improved operating conditions. The risk is that normalization hardens authoritarian rule; the opportunity—however limited—is a shift from chaos toward controlled, if deeply flawed, stability.