The U.S. Supreme Court’s International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) case will continue into 2026, carrying significant implications for both constitutional law and trade compliance. If the Court invalidates the tariffs, refund claims for duties paid under IEEPA could trigger complex litigation and administrative processes, requiring importers to file timely protests with the U.S. Customs and Border Protection or pursue direct appeals to the Court of International Trade, as seen in prior cases like U.S. Shoe Corp. v. United States. On December 17, a federal district order has paused a class-action lawsuit seeking refunds for importers who paid Trump’s IEEPA tariffs on China and the EU until the Supreme Court rules on the tariffs’ legality. This delay means the process of determining class certification will only begin after the high court’s decision. At the same time, the Trump administration is preparing alternative tariff strategies under authorities such as Sections 232, 301, and 338, signaling that even an adverse ruling may not eliminate or reduce the administration’s increase in US import tariff rates. For U.S. businesses, this means continued uncertainty around tariff exposure and compliance costs, making proactive risk management and supply chain diversification critical.
Compounding this uncertainty, USTR Amb. Greer has indicated the administration’s interest in codifying elements of Trump’s tariff regime into law, despite traditional resistance to tariffs among some lawmakers. During a December 9, 2025, Atlantic Council discussion, Amb. Greer noted that members of Congress have approached the Trump administration about legislating a “global baseline” tariff structure to secure long-term trade policy beyond President Trump’s tenure. While codification could provide predictability for businesses, legislative hurdles remain significant, particularly in the Senate, where recent resolutions opposing President Trump’s emergency-based tariffs have been passed. Nonetheless, ongoing discussions and proposed bills—including measures to formalize a 10% baseline tariff and higher rates for strategic goods—underscore a potential shift toward institutionalizing aspects of President Trump’s trade strategy. For U.S. firms in Southeast Asia, codification could lock in higher tariff costs on certain goods, requiring adjustments to pricing strategies and sourcing decisions to remain competitive.
Adding to the evolving trade landscape, a bipartisan group of senators introduced the “Digital Trade Promotion Act” on December 9, 2025, seeking to permanently revive trade promotion authority (TPA) for digital trade agreements. The bill would authorize the president to negotiate bilateral or multilateral digital trade deals under streamlined procedures, allowing agreements to take effect unless Congress passes a joint resolution of disapproval. Unlike prior TPA statutes, the bill has no expiration date and focuses on countering China’s influence over global digital standards by promoting principles such as nondiscriminatory treatment of digital products, prohibitions on digital service taxes, free cross-border data flows, and strong privacy and cybersecurity safeguards. If enacted, this legislation would mark a significant shift toward institutionalizing U.S. leadership in digital trade governance, complementing broader efforts to reshape U.S. tariff policy. This could open new business opportunities in digital services and e-commerce, provided they align with emerging U.S.-led standards on data flows, privacy, and cybersecurity.
As the Supreme Court deliberates on IEEPA tariffs and Congress explores codifying Trump’s trade policies, U.S. businesses face a highly fluid regulatory environment. While tariff risks remain, emerging legislative initiatives—such as the Digital Trade Promotion Act—signal new opportunities in digital trade and data-driven sectors. Companies operating in Southeast Asia should prepare for both heightened compliance obligations and strategic openings by aligning with evolving U.S. trade priorities and engaging proactively in policy discussions. Furthermore, the private sector should plug into ASEAN’s shift toward higher-value manufacturing.
